"Games with a Purpose" are interactive games that users play because they are fun, with the added benefit that the outcome of play is useful work. The ESP game, developed byy von Ahn and Dabbish [2004] , is an example of such a game devised to label images on the web. Since labeling images is a hard problem for computer vision algorithms and can be tedious and time-consuming for humans, the ESP game provides humans with incentive to do useful work by being enjoyable to play. We present a simple game-theoretic model of the ESP game and characterize the equilibrium behavior in our model. Our equilibrium analysis supports the fact that users appear to coordinate on low effort words. We provide an alternate model of user preferences, modeling a change that could be induced through a different scoring method, and show that equilibrium behavior in this model coordinates on high-effort words. We also give sufficient conditions for coordinating on high-effort words to be a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. Our results suggest the possibility of formal incentive design in achieving desirable system-wide outcomes for the purpose of human computation, complementing existing considerations of robustness against cheating and human factors.
INTRODUCTION
The paradigm of human computation considers the possibility that networks of people can be leveraged in solving large-scale problems that are hard for computers to solve. Showcased by the early success of "Games with a Purpose" [von Ahn 2006] (GWAP), human computation provides an example of the broader agenda of "peer production," which seeks to design and understand the problem of promoting large-scale collaborations of humans outside of the traditional framework of firms and price signals [Benkler 2002 ]. Examples of other peer-production systems include Wikipedia, YouTube, question-and-answer forums such as Yahoo! Answers and Naver KnowledgeiN, and Taskcn, a popular Chinese crowdsourcing website.
In order to remedy the problem of users coordinating on common words, which occurs when players adopt low effort and decreasing frequency strategies, we turn to the rarewords preferences model. This is a model in which players wish to match on infrequent words before frequent words, we suppose because of appropriately designed incentives, and where the speed with which a match is achieved is no longer a consideration.
We show that under this preference model, there is a significant difference in the equilibrium structure, in that playing words in order of decreasing frequency is now a strictly dominated strategy and playing words in order of increasing frequency is an ex-post Nash equilibrium. This promotes matching on lower frequency words, with the frequency of the word matched upon, for the same pair of dictionaries, under the (increasing, increasing) strategy profile at least as low as the (decreasing, decreasing) strategy profile. Given additional structure on the utility model we identify an equilibrium behavior that shows a useful focusing on lower frequency words. We show that high effort is a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium for Zipfian distributions over word frequencies under certain classes of utility functions that satisfy rare-words first preferences. This class of utility functions satisfies an additive discount property, meaning that the difference in value between successive outcomes is an additive constant. We focus on Zipfian distributions since the distribution of words in the English language follows a Zipfian distribution with exponent very close to 1.
The main results obtained in the rare-words preferences model are the following. Many of these results adopt a robust equilibrium concept, namely, ordinal Bayesian Nash equilibrium. In this equilibrium notion, we look for Bayesian-Nash equilibria that hold for all valuations satisfying a given-preference model. In many cases, our results hold for any distribution over the universe of words U , for example, Theorems 1, 2 and 3. It should be noted in this case, these results don't require that player 1 and player 2 have the same distribution of words over the universe U ; it is only required that the total ordering of words in the universe U is the same.
The results in this article provide a simple explanation for why coordinating on low effort, generic words is reasonable to expect in the ESP game, and suggest an alternative incentive structure to obtain coordination on higher effort, more descriptive words. More specifically, Theorem 1.4 shows that to achieve coordination on low frequency, descriptive words, it suffices to have a constant difference in points, that is, additive utility function, between each successive word in the relevant universe U of words for an image. Still, the system designer does not know the set of words in the universe a priori. One way to address this is to award points based on the current knowledge of the relevant words, with the points modified later through a delayed reward system, given refined knowledge of the word universe through subsequent game play. The frequency ordering within this image-relevant universe can just be the ordering in the English language. Although this proposed scheme is adopting the universe as played by users, itself endogeneous to outcomes of the game, it seems likely to provide a reasonable implementation of our preference model. Ho et al. [2007] and Chang et al. [2007] develop a simple game called PhotoSlap, for determining content of images, based on the popular card game Snap. These authors provide a game-theoretic analysis for PhotoSlap and are able to establish that the desired behavior from a system-wide perspective is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. To our knowledge, Ho et al. [2007] and Chang et al. [2007] is the first application of game theory to human computation, however their model and analysis are specific to their game and cannot be applied to the ESP game. Our model of the ESP game requires a more intricate analysis, due to the fact that we model it as a game of imperfect information rather than a game of perfect information, and the action space for our ESP game model is much larger than the action space for the PhotoSlap model.
Related Work
von Ahn and Dabbish [2008] provide a classification of games with a purpose: outputagreement games, such as the ESP game, inversion-problem games, such as Peekaboom, and input-agreement games, such as TagATune. They provide the key elements of each class in order to ensure the intended computation is done and discuss general design paradigms for increasing enjoyment and output quality. study the verification mechanisms used in various GWAP and classify the verification mechanisms into two classes, the sequential verification mechanism (as used in inversionproblem and input-agreement games) and the simultaneous verification mechanism (as used in output-agreement games), and model games that use these verification mechanisms. These authors model the simultaneous verification mechanism (as in ESP) as a one-shot symmetric coordination game for a report of a single word, and need to appeal to a focal point argument to explain why players will coordinate on the most frequent word. also model a sequential verification game as an extensive form game of imperfect information and show that desirable system wide outcome is supported in an equilibrium.
In an experimental study of the data generated from the Google Image Labeler, Weber et al. [2008] show that the set of tags for a given image are generated from a low entropy distribution, and that labels entered by players are highly predictable given Taboo Words. In establishing the second point, the authors test a bot programmed with a simple language model learned from the Google Image Labeler, which infers what label should come next solely from the set of Taboo Words already present and derives no information from the image itself. They find that this bot agrees with a human player 81% of the time on images that have at least one Taboo Word. The analysis of Weber et al. [2008] suggests that players are tending to match on synonyms and colors. For instance, they find that 81% of images labeled "guy" also labeled "man" and over 10% of Taboo Words from approximately 14.5K images are colors. In order to remedy this problem, these authors propose two alternate scoring schemes, such as rewarding players for a label with value inversely proportional to the probability that this label would be entered given the set of Taboo Words, and rewarding players based on the amount of information gain from each new label, but do not provide a game-theoretic analysis.
Game-theoretic models of other peer production systems have been proposed, including a study of scoring mechanisms in Yahoo! Answers [Jain et al. 2009 ], all-pay auction models of crowdsourcing systems (such as Taskcn and TopCoder) [DiPalatino and Vojnovic 2009; Archak and Sundararajan 2009; Chawla et al. 2011; Cavallo and Jain 2012] and related models in regard to the optimal design of contests [Moldovanu and Sela 2001; 2006] , and analysis of attention mechanisms in social computing systems [Ghosh and McAfee 2011; Ghosh and Hummel 2011] . In addition to this, a number of empirical studies of user behavior in various peer production systems show that some fraction of users in these systems are behaving strategically [Yang et al. 2008; Adamic et al. 2008; Nam et al. 2009 ], motivating the use of game theory to study such systems.
THE ESP GAME
The ESP Game [von Ahn and Dabbish 2004 ] is a two-player game for labeling images on the web. Labeling images has proven to be a hard problem for computer vision, yet it is something that humans can do easily [Barnard et al. 2003 ]. However, in order to label images, humans require some sort of incentive for this normally tedious task. This is achieved in the ESP game by making the game fun to play.
In the ESP game, players are randomly paired and each player is presented with the same image. Once the two players have entered a common word, this common word becomes the label for the image. Players cannot communicate with each other while they are entering words for the image and once they agree on a common word, they only see the common word that they agreed upon. Players are paired for a set of 15 images and each pair tries to label as many of the images as they can in 2.5 minutes. Players receive a fixed number of points for each successful label. In the set of 15 images, players get bonus points labeling five images, ten images, and fifteen images. Players can pass on difficult images and they are revisited at the end of a set. The only word that is used from the two input streams of an image is the first common word that is entered. It is intuitive that words upon which players will agree are likely to be relevant to the image given that it is the image, and nothing else, around which the players can coordinate. The game includes a scoreboard, with the names of players with the highest scores, that is updated daily. Empirical studies of other peer-production systems has shown that points are a key feature in motivating users [Nam et al. 2009] . Fig. 1 . Decision Tree for a Single Player. Players choose an effort level which dictates from which portion of a universe of words they sample their dictionary. The process of sampling a dictionary can be thought of as a move by nature. Finally, a player outputs a permutation on her dictionary.
A Formal ESP Model
We model the ESP game as a two-stage game of imperfect information. In our model, when a player decides to play the ESP game, she is presented with an image and thinks up words to represent the image. She then makes a decision about how to enter words depending how likely she is to match with the other player on those words. We focus on modeling the game associated with one of the images in a set.
Let there be a universe of n words U = {w 1 , w 2 , . . . , w n } associated with the image at hand and let 1 < d < n denote the dictionary size, or the number of words that each player samples from the universe.
1 Each word in the universe has an associated frequency, where f i denotes the frequency of word w i in the English language and n i=1 f i = 1. Each player knows the frequency of the words sampled and can therefore rank words according to frequency.
2
Even though this is a game without any communication between players, it is useful to decompose the strategy of a player into two components that we associated with a first stage, that is, choosing an effort level, and a second stage, that is, choosing a permutation on a sampled dictionary. We give a decision tree for a player in Figure 1 . In the first stage, a player chooses an effort level: E = {L, H} for low or high. The choice of effort level determines the set of words in the universe from which a player samples her dictionary. The sampled dictionary can be thought of as a move by nature. If a player chooses L in the first stage, the dictionary is sampled from the top n > n L > 0 words (without replacement). That is, word i in the top n L words is chosen first with probability
. Let U L be the set of the highest n L frequency words in U , or the "low universe". In addition, let D L denote the set of all possible dictionaries a player could obtain if she played L effort. If a player chooses effort H, the dictionary is sampled from the top n H words, where n H = n, without replacement. In other words, the dictionary is sampled from the entire universe of words. That is word i in U is chosen with probability f i,H = f i . Similarly, D H denotes the set of all possible dictionaries a player could obtain if she played H effort. Note that we assume d < n L .
Given a word x ∈ U , we let f e (x) represent the probability of sampling x given that the player has chosen effort level e. This sample is modeled as a move by nature and can be considered to be the point at which a player learns her "type", namely her dictionary 1 Sometimes we use the additional assumption that d ≤ n 2 . 2 Additionally, assume that the words in the universe are ordered in terms of decreasing frequency, that is
of words. Both players are symmetric and each player has the same decision space. Note that n L , n H , and d are parameters of the model.
In the second stage, once each player privately learns her dictionary based on the effort level chosen, players choose a permutation on the words. This models the decision in the ESP game about the order in which a player should enter words. This order on a player's dictionary defines the second-stage action of each player and determines the outcome of the game. The outcome is defined by the first word that is in the ordered list of both players and the location (where the location is defined as the maximum value of the two positions where the word occurs in each ordered list) at which that occurs.
Let D 1 be the dictionary for player 1 and D 2 be the dictionary for player 2. The second stage strategy s 1 ∈ S 1 for player 1 defines a specific order s 1 (D 1 ) on D 1 , for every possible dictionary. Given an effort level, which induces a distribution on sampled dictionaries, the second-stage strategy of a player defines a specific order in which words are played, for every possible dictionary. Likewise, player 2 has a second-stage strategy s 2 ∈ S 2 that defines an order on every possible dictionary.
A complete strategy for the ESP game is a pair σ i = (e i , s i ) ∈ E× S i = i . This defines the play in both stages, with the second-level strategy s i defining the order in which words in the dictionary are played for all possible dictionaries sampled under effort level e i . We focus on pure strategies, which exist in our game.
Definition 2.1. We define a match as follows: Suppose player 1 outputs a list of words x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x d and player 2 outputs a list of words y 1 , y 2 , . . . , y d . If there exists 1 ≤ i, j ≤ d such that x i = y j , then there is a match in location max (i, j) . The first match is the pair i, j that minimizes max (i, j) such that x i = y j .
Given this, an outcome is a pair
indicates there was no match and the (w, l) pair otherwise indicates that the first match occurred on word w ∈ U in location l ∈ L, where L = {1, 2, . . . , d} ∪ φ. Let O denote the set of possible outcomes. Let outcome function g(s 1 (D 1 ), s 2 (D 2 )) ∈ O denote the outcome given s 1 , s 2 , D 1 , and D 2 , with the location (if any) of the first match is denoted g l (s 1 (D 1 ), s 2 (D 2 )) ∈ L and the word the first match occurs is denoted
Each player i has a utility function v i : O → + which induces a weak total preference ordering on outcomes. We assume that both players have the same utility function. We consider two preference models: match-early preferences and rare-words preferences. In both cases, we work with an ordinal model of preferences.
Definition 2.2. For match-early preferences, we require the following preference ordering on outcomes:
Since players are indifferent between which word they match upon under matchearly preferences, we can simply describe the outcome of the match as a location, i.e. l i can be used to describe any element in the set {(w 1 , l i ), (w 2 , l i ), . . . , (w n , l i )}. We say that a utility v i is consistent with match-early preferences if and only if
This preference model captures the fact that players prefer to match with their opponent as opposed to not matching, and players prefer to match in an earlier location rather than a later location. Players are agnostic as to which word is matched and care only about location.
Definition 2.3. For rare-words preferences, we require the following preference ordering on outcomes:
Under rare-words preferences, players are indifferent between which location they match and only care about which word they match upon. Therefore, we can simply use a word to denote the outcome, that is w i can be used to describe any element in the set
We say that a utility function is consistent with rare-words preferences if and only if
Let Pr(D i |e i ) denote the probability of dictionary D i given effort level e i . We often write this as Pr(D i ) and leave the effort level implicit. Given this, we now define the probability of first match in a particular location when player i knows her own type but has only probabilistic information on the dictionary of the other player.
Definition 2.4. The probability of a match in location l i , given s 1 (D 1 ), s 2 , and a distribution on dictionaries Pr(
Definition 2.5. The probability of a match on word w j , given s 1 (D 1 ), s 2 , and a distri-
denote the expected (interim) utility to player i given dictionary D i but with respect to a distribution on the possible dictionary of the other player, as induced by her effort level. Another way to express the expected interim utility to player i given dictionary D i uses the probability of first match vector previously defined:
to denote the expected (ex-ante) utility to player i before either dictionaries are sampled, given complete strategies σ = (σ 1 , σ 2 ).
Equilibrium Framework
In analyzing the equilibrium of the ESP game, it will be helpful to isolate a restricted game, or in other words, the game induced by a fixed pair of first stage strategies (i.e., efforts) of each player. For a complete strategy profile (σ 1 , σ 2 ) to be an equilibrium, it is necessary that neither player can usefully deviate to an alternate second-stage strategy. Of course this is not sufficient to establish an equilibrium of the full game, in that a player might still usefully deviate to an alternate effort in combination with an alternate second stage strategy. To continue, consider the game induced by fixing effort levels (e 1 , e 2 ) for the two players. This is a restricted game, that we refer to here as the second stage game, which is conditioned on effort e 1 and e 2 . In this second stage game, each player knows her own dictionary but not the dictionary of the other player. Given this, we can define some useful equilibrium concepts. Definition 2.6. Second-stage strategy profile s * = (s * 1 , s * 2 ) is an ex post Nash equilibrium of the second stage of the ESP game conditioned on effort levels e 1 and e 2 , if:
This equilibrium is strict as long as there exists a pair of D 1 , D 2 such that this inequality is strict.
We will adopt an analysis approach that establishes a strict ordinal Bayesian-Nash equilibrium, 3 in the sense that we identify strategies that are an equilibrium for all utility functions consistent with match-early preferences.
Definition 2.7. Strategy profile s * = (s * 1 , s * 2 ) is a strict ordinal Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of the second-stage of the ESP game conditioned on effort levels e 1 and e 2 , if for all u i consistent with match-early preferences,
where the probability adopted in interim utility u i for the distribution on the dictionary of player −i is induced by the effort of that player in the first stage.
There is an identical definition of ordinal Bayesian-Nash equilibrium for the secondstage of the ESP game for rare-words preferences. We also define ordinal BayesianNash equilibrium for the entire game.
2 ) ∈ 1 × 2 is a strict ordinal BayesianNash equilibrium of the ESP game if for every u i consistent with match early preferences, we have
Likewise, there is an identical definition of ordinal Bayesian-Nash equilibrium for the complete ESP game for rare-words preferences. Since the effort level chosen by each player is not visible to the other player, there is no need for a subgame perfect refinement. Next, we define the notion of stochastic dominance for a general utility function. Our definition uses the following notation: Suppose that u(s i , 
The following theorem equates our definition of stochastic dominance and ordinal Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. We omit the proof of the following theorem since it is a standard proof in stochastic dominance [Hanoch and Levy 1969] This means that we can use the stochastic dominance condition to establish ordinal Bayesian-Nash equilibrium for the second-stage of the ESP game and the complete ESP game. We define stochastic dominance more specifically for the second-stage game and the complete ESP game under each preference model as needed.
Remarks about the Model
We model the ESP game with each player sampling words from a universe of possible words associated with the image, to which we associate a frequency ordering. Players can vary the effort level that relates to how likely they are to sample frequent words as opposed to infrequent words. Then players decide which order to play their sampled words in the game.
We capture the idea that there are 15 images in a set, with a limited amount of time, by considering match-early preferences. We do not model a sequential decision making process, where users choose an effort level before sampling and entering each successive word. We omit this because there seems to be little inference a player can make about the strategy of the other player from the limited information revealed. All a player learns is that no match has occurred. This provides little evidence, for example, to discriminate between a player playing frequent words or a player playing rare words. Rather it seems more likely that strategy updates occur after a successful match, where a player learns what word provided the match. In addition, the time frame per image is rather small; that is, 2.5 minutes for 15 images. Thus, it seems unlikely that users are updating their strategy during the play on a particular image. It would be interesting to empirically analyze the data from the ESP game to examine whether, and if so when, strategy updates occur.
The universe of words for an image models the set of words that are in some way relevant to the image, and represent the knowledge that the game designer is trying to learn. Each of these words is relevant to the image at hand. For example, if we had an image of a Victorian house and we had the two labels, "building" and "Victorian house", both are relevant, while one is more descriptive than the other [Weber et al. 2008] .
The decision of a player is modeled with a "first stage" choice of effort level and a "second stage" choice of permutation on a sampled dictionary. Note that the use of "stage" does not imply an observable action after the choice of effort level. What we refer to as the "second stage" is merely an effort-constrained game, induced by a pair of effort levels chosen by the players. We often use "second stage" and "effort-constrained game" interchangeably. Given the equilibrium analysis in the effort-constrained game, we analyze the complete game by fixing the strategies determined in the effort-constrained game analysis and examining the choice of effort level in the first stage. We refer to this analysis as the "complete game" analysis.
It should be noted that in many cases, the results in this article generalize to any number of effort levels, but we describe all the results using two effort levels for simplicity. In order for the results to generalize to any number of effort levels, we need the mappings in Sections 3.2 and 4.2, to satisfy the following properties: (1) the lower effort level's universe needs to be a strict subset of the higher effort level's universe; and (2) the lower effort level's universe needs to contain the highest frequency words of the higher effort level's universe. We discuss the generalization of the results as they are introduced in this article.
Additionally, in many cases, only the total ordering of words in the universe U , and not necessarily the exact frequency distribution, needs to be consistent across players. Whenever a specific distribution is not imposed on U and the result is mentioned to hold for any distribution over U , the result holds for the case that only the total ordering of words via frequency is the same. Finally, the model can be generalized to handle the case where each player has a different universe of words. In such a case, a player would have no reason to enter a word that is not in the other player's universe. Therefore, the results would hold for a universe of words that is the intersection of both players sets of words.
In sampling words, it seems reasonable to model this sampling process for any given image according to the distribution induced on the image-relevant universe by the frequencies of words in the English language because there is cognitive effort required to retrieve less frequently used words. Likewise, the English language is coded efficiently in that the more frequent, common words are generally shorter whereas the less frequent, more descriptive words are generally longer (and thus take more effort to type). We establish that low effort is an equilibrium under match-early preferences even without associating a differential cost with a user's effort, which would increase with high effort and provide an increased preference towards low effort.
Match-early preferences model a player who prefers to match sooner rather than later on an image, due to the time-constraint on all 15 images in the ESP game. The actual implementation of the ESP game assigns the same number of points to players if they match, regardless of where the match occurs (e.g., how many words they enter before they match), and regardless of which word the match occurs. Despite this, players are under a time constraint and should prefer to match sooner rather than later, in order to match on as many images as possible in the allotted amount of time. We adopt an ordinal model of preferences, so that we do not have to quantify exactly how much players prefer to match sooner rather than later. Rare-words preferences model a player who prefers to match on rarer words than more frequent words, and is indifferent between the location in which the match occurs, presumably because users will be given more time for a set of images such that time is no longer such a key constraint.
We restrict our attention to strategies that involve playing all words in the dictionary since any strategy that does not involve playing all words is weakly dominated by one that involves playing all words. Moreover, we will look for equilibrium of the secondstage of the ESP game in consistent strategies, which are strategies for a player that do not change the relative ordering of elements depending on the player's realized dictionary. In other words, a consistent second-stage strategy involves specifying a total ordering of elements on U e (after choosing an effort level e) and applying that total ordering to the realized dictionary. We do not restrict agents to only playing consistent strategies, but rather identify equilibria in which a player does not wish to deviate to an inconsistent strategy. A consistent strategy s specifies a total ordering on the set U e : w 1 w 2 · · · w |U e | , where w i is not necessarily the same as w i . In fact, w i = w i for all i if and only if s = s ↓ , where s ↓ is the strategy in which a player plays her words in order of decreasing frequency. Equilibria in consistent strategies seem natural because of their simplicity, requiring that word x is played before word y independent of whether any word z is present in a player's dictionary.
EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS UNDER MATCH-EARLY PREFERENCES
In this section, we analyze the equilibrium behavior under match-early preferences. We show that playing decreasing frequency in conjunction with low effort is an ordinal Bayesian-Nash equilibrium for the ESP game. All omitted proofs can be found in the Appendix.
Equilibrium Analysis of the Effort-Constrained Game
First we see that playing words in order of decreasing frequency is not an ex-post Nash equilibrium for the second stage game. PROOF. Suppose D 2 = {w 2 , w 3 } and D 1 = {w 1 , w 2 }, s 2 (D 2 ) dictates player 2 will play w 2 followed by w 3 . If player 1 deviates from s 1 and plays w 2 followed by w 1 , then player 1 will get higher utility.
Since playing words in order of decreasing frequency is not an ex-post Nash equilibrium, we focus instead on establishing ordinal Bayesian-Nash equilibrium via stochastic dominance. We define stochastic dominance for the ordering on outcomes under match-early preferences.
Definition 3.2. Fixing effort levels e 1 and e 2 , fixing the opponent's second-stage strategy s 2 , and fixing dictionary D 1 , we say that the second-level ordering s 1 (D 1 ) stochastically dominates the second-level ordering s 1 (D 1 ) with respect to match-early preferences if and only if
We say that the stochastic dominance property is strict if there exists a k such that In what follows, we show that "playing decreasing frequency" is a strict ordinal Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of the second-stage ESP game, for any pairs of effort levels e 1 , e 2 and for any distribution over U . Moreover, we show that this equilibrium is one of the few ordinal Bayesian-Nash equilibrium that holds for every distribution over U . We obtain a characterization result and show that the set of strategy profiles that are ordinal Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of the second-stage game satisfy an "almost decreasing" property. The crux of the argument will be to establish stochastic dominance.
Algorithm 1 describes a possible strategy for player 1 in terms of player 2's secondlevel strategy s 2 . It takes as input any sampled dictionary D 1 , the distribution over U , her opponent's effort level e 2 , and the second-level strategy s 2 of player 2 and outputs an ordering on the words in D 1 . In order to get a completely specified strategy for player 1 from Algorithm 1, we run the algorithm for all possible dictionaries D 1 ∈ D 1 .
to the end of the ordered list s 1 (D 1 ) end output: s 1 (D 1 ) Algorithm 1 implicitly takes into account the effort level of player 2. If player 2 is playing a lower effort level than player 1, player 1 will play those words in D 1 ∩ U e 2 followed by any words in D 1 that are not in U e 2 (these are the higher effort words that player 2 did not sample). Likewise, if player 2 is playing a higher effort level than player 1, this algorithm still computes a feasible output ordering for player 1. Since the higher effort words that player 2 may have are not in her sampled dictionary, she cannot play them.
We say that the output of Algorithm 1 with respect to dictionary D is in agreement with s 2 if for all pairs of words w i , w j ∈ D, Algorithm 1 specifies playing w i before w j if and only if w i w j in s 2 . Recall that we look for equilibrium in consistent strategies and so s 2 is associated with a well-defined ordering.
This algorithm does not always output an ordering that stochastically dominates all other orderings in the sense of Definition 3.2. But, any time it fails to produce such an output, we show that no such ordering exists.
The following definition is useful in characterizing the output of Algorithm 1. Note that the set {w 1 , . . . , w n } is ordered according to s 2 , that is, s 2 specifies playing the following total order on words: w 1 w 2 · · · w n . We also use the notation that w i ∈ l k (s 2 (D 2 )) means that word w i is the k th highest priority word in dictionary D 2 , when s 2 acts on D 2 . Similarly, in the following definition w i ∈ l ≤k (s 2 (D 2 )) means that word w i is among the k highest priority words of dictionary D 2 .
Definition 3.3. We say that second-stage strategy s 2 satisfies the preservation condition for a particular distribution, if for a fixed effort level of player 2 and for every pair of w i and w j such that i < j, we have that Pr(
Definition 3.4. We say that s 2 satisfies the strong condition for a particular distribution, if for a fixed effort level of player 2 and for every pair of w i and w j such that i < j − 1, we have that Pr(
In an almost decreasing strategy; the first n − 1 words of s 2 are sorted in order of the decreasing frequency, but the last word may not necessarily be the least frequent word of U . Therefore, there are a total of n strategies that satisfy this property. We use the term, almost decreasing strategy profile, to describe a symmetric strategy profile (s, s), where s is an almost decreasing strategy.
Definition 3.5. We say that a consistent strategy s 2 satisfies the almost decreasing property if and only if f (w i ) > f (w j ), for all 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n − 1. 
, s 2 ) since Algorithm 1 will output the word (of the remaining words) that will be the most likely to appear in the top i words of player 2. Therefore,
Recall from Theorem 2.10, that stochastic dominance, as defined in Definition 3.2, is a necessary condition in order to have utility maximization for all utilities consistent with match early preferences.
The following lemma gives sufficient conditions on the strategy of player 2 such that Algorithm 1 will always output an ordering in agreement with s 2 , and such that this strategy will stochastically dominate all other strategies. 
) for all i, j, k where i < k < j or in other words, the strong condition is satisfied. Therefore, Lemma 3.7, along with Theorem 2.10, gives the desired result.
This lemma tells us that that strategy profile (s 1 , s 2 ), with s 1 = s 2 , cannot be an ordinal Bayesian-Nash equilibrium under the uniform distribution, because under the uniform distribution over U , for every sampled dictionary, s 2 generates a distribution on outcomes that strictly stochastically dominates s 1 = s 2 . Therefore, for every utility function consistent with match-early preferences, player 1 would prefer to deviate from s 1 to s 2 . Therefore, if a strategy profile is an ordinal Bayesian-Nash equilibrium for all distributions over U , then it must be that case that the strategy profile is symmetric.
It should be noted that the statement of Lemma 3.9 can easily be generalized to take care of the case where players play different effort levels, but still under the uniform distribution over the words in U . If player 1 is playing a lower effort level than player 2, (s 2 , s 2 ) is a strict Bayesian-Nash equilibrium for every s 2 , where s 2 is a total ordering on the set U e 2 and s 2 is s 2 with all the words in the set U e 2 − U e 1 removed. Likewise, if player 2 is playing a lower effort level than player 1, (s 2 , s 2 ) is a strict Bayesian-Nash equilibrium for every s 2 , where s 2 is a total ordering on the set U e 2 and s 2 is s 2 with all the words in the set U e 1 − U e 2 concatenated to the end of s 2 , for example, all words in U e 1 − U e 2 are lower priority than all words in U e 2 under s 2 .
Lemma 3.10 tells us that for every symmetric strategy profile (except for the almost decreasing strategy profiles), there exists a distribution such that this strategy profile is not an ordinal Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. Lemma 3.9 rules out the possibility of an asymmetric strategy profile as an ordinal Bayesian-Nash equilibrium that holds for every distribution over U and Lemma 3.10 rules out the possibility of a symmetric strategy profile (except for the almost decreasing strategy profiles) as an ordinal Bayesian-Nash equilibrium that holds for every distribution over U . Therefore, Lemmas 3.9 and 3.10 can be used to establish Theorem 1.1, where it is shown that the almost decreasing strategy profiles are the only strategy profiles that are an ordinal Bayesian-Nash equilibrium for every distribution over U . PROOF. Lemma 3.8 tells us that Algorithm 1 will always output a strategy in agreement with s ↓ 2 , if player 2 is playing s ↓ 2 , regardless of D 1 and the distribution over U . Furthermore, this strategy stochastically dominates all other strategies, for every distribution over U . Lemma 3.9 tells us that there exists a distribution, namely the uniform distribution, for which Algorithm 1 will output an ordering in agreement with s 2 , regardless of the dictionary D 1 , for all s 2 that are consistent. Moreover, this strategy will stochastically dominate all others, for the uniform distribution. Lemma 3.10 tells us that there exists a distribution F(U ) and dictionary D 1 for which Algorithm 1 will output an ordering that is not in agreement with s 2 , for all s 2 that are not almost decreasing. Either this strategy stochastically dominates all others, for this distribution F(U ), or it does not. In the former case, we have exhibited two distributions that have two different strategies that stochastically dominate all others. In the latter case, we know that there is no strategy that stochastically dominates all others for the distribution F(U ) from Lemma 3.6. Therefore, there is no single strategy for player 1 that stochastically dominates all others when player 2 is playing s 2 , where s 2 is not almost decreasing, for all distributions over U and every utility function that satisfies match-early preferences.
Definition 3.11. We say that the distribution on words in the universe satisfies a Zipfian distribution if and only if f (w i ) = 
Equilibrium Analysis of the Complete Game
In the results that follow, we show that playing L at the top-level together with playing words in order of decreasing frequency is a strict ordinal Bayesian-Nash equilibrium for all distributions except the uniform distribution over U . For the case of the uniform distribution, ((L, s Definition 3.14. Fixing player 2's strategy (e 2 , s 2 ), we say that strategy (e 1 , s 1 ) for player 1 stochastically dominates strategy (e 1 , s 1 ) for player 1, with respect to the outcome ordering of match-early preferences, if and only if: 
,e 2 (k) = ∅) since the expression on the left hand side is simply the probability that a match occurs in the first k locations given that (s 1 ,
, which is exactly the probability that player 1's "top k" words overlap with player 2's "top k" words.
In order to establish stochastic dominance, we construct a randomized mapping for each dictionary that can be sampled when playing H to a number of dictionaries that can be sampled when playing L. Each dictionary in D H is mapped to a dictionary in D L that is at least as likely to match against the opponent's dictionary, averaged over the distribution of all possible dictionaries for the opponent. This is shown in Lemma 3.16. In order to complete the proof, it is necessary to show that under the randomized mapping, no element in D L is mapped to with greater probability under the randomized mapping than under the original distribution over D L . This fact is shown in Lemma 3.17.
We say that dictionary D with elements {w 1 , w 2 , . . . , w n } (in order of decreasing frequency) dominates dictionary D with elements {w 1 , w 2 , . . . , w n } (in order of decreasing 
Thus, we have established that: Pr(D 2 satisfies P ) > Pr(D 2 satisfies P).
For the following lemmas, we use the randomized mapping h: Consider a dictionary D ∈ D H , D = A∪ B, where A is the set of "low words" and B is the set of "high words" (in 
In addition, the inequality is strict for all k ≥ k when h(D (D 1,H ) . Since the dictionaries are in sorted order, this means
Lemma 3.17 states that the distribution obtained from sampling U L directly is the same as the distribution obtained from sampling a high dictionary, followed by the randomized mapping (i.e., sampling U H until you get d low words). The proof is easy and omitted.
Lemma 3.18 uses Lemmas 3.16 and 3.17 to show that playing L stochastically dominates playing H under match-early preferences, assuming players play decreasing frequency in the second stage. It is also important to note that this argument is independent of the number of effort levels so the equilibrium analysis continues to hold as we vary the number of effort levels, as long as there are at least two. 
PROOF. From Lemma 3.17, we know that:
This is equivalent to writing:
where the inequality follows from Lemma 3.16. We know that the inequality is strict for all k since there exists a D 
)) is not a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of the complete ESP game for any distribution over U , except the uniform distribution, and for any utility function that satisfies match-early preferences.
These results can be generalized to a model with any number of effort levels. Consider m effort levels, where m < n, these results would generalize as follows: Playing the lowest effort level in conjunction with decreasing frequency, for both players, would be a strict ordinal Bayesian-Nash equilibrium for any distribution over U and any utility function satisfying match-early preferences. Moreover, playing the lowest effort level in conjunction with decreasing frequency would be a strict ordinal best response to playing any higher effort level with decreasing frequency, for any distribution over U and any utility function satisfying match-early preferences. The randomized mapping that these results rely on can be generalized. Recall that the randomized mapping maps each high dictionary to a set of low dictionaries that do at least as well in expectation against the opponent's dictionary. The interpretation of the randomized mapping is that each higher effort level dictionary is mapped to a lower effort level dictionary with the probability that a player would get that low dictionary if continuing to sample words until receiving d low words. This mapping will work as long as the lower effort level's universe is a strict subset of the higher effort level's universe and the lower effort level's universe contains the highest frequency words of the higher effort level's universe.
THE EFFECT OF RARE-WORDS PREFERENCES
In this section, we consider the effect of rare-words preferences on the equilibrium analysis. We look to understand whether there is a high-effort equilibrium available in this preference model, when players care about matching on rare words and are indifferent between the location that they match.
For the second stage, we show that playing words in order of decreasing frequency is strictly dominated, in stark contrast with the previous section. Also, playing words in order of increasing frequency is an ex-post Nash equilibrium of the second-stage game, for all pairs of effort levels chosen in the first stage. Although, we show that
) cannot be an ordinal Bayesian-Nash equilibrium in the complete game for any distribution over U , we show that for every distribution over U , there exists a utility function for which ((H, s
) is an ordinal Bayesian-Nash equilibrium for every distribution over U and this leads to a better outcome from the system designer's perspective for every pair of player dictionaries. Finally, we demonstrate sufficient conditions on the utility function for Zipfian distributions in order for ((H, s ↑ 1 ), (H, s ↑ 2 )) to be a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium under rare-words preferences.
Equilibrium Analysis of the Effort-Constrained Game
We show that in this model, playing words in order of increasing frequency is not a dominant strategy equilibrium.
Definition 4.1. Second-stage strategy profile s * 1 is a dominant strategy of the second stage of the ESP game conditioned on effort levels e 1 and e 2 , if:
Definition 4.2. Second-stage strategy profile s 1 is a dominated strategy of the second stage of the ESP game conditioned on effort levels e 1 and e 2 , if there exists an s 1 such that: The statement of Theorem 1.3 can be generalized to handle the case where players are playing different effort levels. In the case that player 1 is playing a higher effort level than player 2, player 1's best response to is play increasing on the set D 1 ∩ U e 2 , followed by the words in the set D 1 ∩ (U e 1 − U e 2 ) (in any order). Likewise, in the case that player 2 is playing a higher effort level than player 1, player 2's best response is to play increasing on the set D 2 ∩ U e 1 (in any order), followed by the words in the set D 2 ∩ (U e 1 − U e 2 ) (in any order). This "generalized" increasing strategy can be shown to be an ex-post Nash equilibrium. 
Equilibrium Analysis of the Complete Game
In order to analyze the top-level game, we define stochastic dominance under the order on outcomes associated with rare-words preferences.
Definition 4.5. Fixing player 2's strategy (e 2 , s 2 ), we say that strategy (e 1 , s 1 ) for player 1 stochastically dominates strategy (e 1 , s 1 ) for player 1 with respect to the ordering on outcomes given by rare-words preferences, if and only if: Pr(D 2,e 2 |e 2 )I(g w (s 1 (D 1,e 1 ), s 2 (D 2,e 2 )) ∈ {w n , . . . , w n−k+1 }) ∀k.
In addition, we say the stochastic dominance is strict if there exists a k such that the preceding inequality is strict.
The next two propositions give general results about strategies in the complete ESP game and use the randomized mapping from the previous section to map each high dictionary to a low dictionary that does at least as well as it in expectation. A designer will prefer this equilibrium to the ((L, s It should be noted that the previous proposition can be generalized to handle the case where there are more than two effort levels. In such a model, we would have exerting the lowest effort level in conjunction with increasing frequency, for both players, as a strict ordinal Bayesian-Nash equilibrium for every distribution over U under rarewords preferences. We would not have this result for any effort level that is not the lowest, since Proposition 6 would generalize to any effort level that is not the lowest.
The following remark establishes that the (s The following proposition follows from the fact that if player 2 plays H, player 1 maximizes the probability of matching by playing L, yet maximizes the probability of matching on the "rarest" word by playing H. PROOF. We show that the inequality in Definition 4.5 does not hold for k = n when (e 2 , s 2 ) = (H, s The previous proposition can be generalized to handle the case where there are more than two effort levels. In such a model, we would have that for any effort level e i that is not the lowest, playing e i in conjunction with increasing frequency is not an ordinal Bayesian-Nash equilibrium for any distribution over U under rare-words preferences.
The implication of Proposition 4.8 is that for every distribution over U , there exists a utility function for which (H, s 2 )) as a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. We restrict attention to the Zipfian distribution over U and multiplicative and additive valuation functions. 
In order to prove positive results for the top level of the game under this new preference model, we use similar techniques as the previous section. In particular, we use a "randomized mapping", except in this case, we think of mapping each dictionary in D L to a subset of dictionaries in D H . Rather than explicitly defining a mapping and providing an intuitive explanation for the mapping as we did in the previous section, we show that a valid mapping exists. In order to show that a valid mapping exists, we first define a linear system of equations that a mapping must satisfy in order to be valid. We then prove that a solution to the system of equations exists, by defining a second system of equations. The second system of equations corresponds to the linear system of equations that a mapping from the previous section must satisfy in order to be valid. We show that a solution exists to this second system of equations (Lemma 4.10) and that if a solution to the second system of equations exists, then a solution to the first system of equations exists (Lemma 4.11).
We start by defining a linear system of equations that a mapping must satisfy in order to be valid. 
. A valid mapping must satisfy the following properties:
(1)
In order for the mapping to be valid, it must also be the case that 0 ≤ x ij ≤ 1 for all i, j. Note that in this system of the equations, some of the x ij are removed so that they will always be set to 0. A variable x ij is removed from this set of equations if and only
In order to show that a solution to the above system of linear equations exists, we give a second system of linear equations. This system of equations is exactly the set of equations that the mapping from the previous section needed to satisfy in order to be a valid mapping.
Similar to the previous system of linear equations, it must also be the case that 0 ≤ y ij ≤ 1 for all i, j, and some of the y ij are removed so that they will always be set to 0. A variable y ij is removed from this set of equations if and only if D Lemma 4.12 states that the distribution obtained from sampling U H directly is the same as the distribution obtained from sampling a low dictionary, followed by the randomized mapping. This follows immediately from the second set of conditions we require the randomized mapping to satisfy.
We say that dictionary D with elements {w d , w d−1 , . . . , w 1 } (in order of increasing frequency) dominates dictionary D with elements {w d , w d−1 , . . . , w 1 } (in order of increasing frequency) if f (w i ) ≤ f (w i ) for all i. We say that the dominance is strict if D = D.
For the following lemmas, we use this randomized mapping, which satisfies the
We show that if the randomized mapping satisfies this property, it must be the case that each low dictionary is mapped to a high dictionary that dominates it.
Since the dictionaries are in sorted order, w j = w i for some j > i, however this means there exists a for all k, we have that:
In addition, the inequality is strict when g(
Lemma 4.15 uses Lemmas 4.14 and 4.12 to show that playing H yields greater utility than L, given that the other playing is playing H, assuming players play increasing frequency in the second stage. It is also important to note that this argument is independent of the number of effort levels so the equilibrium analysis holds as we vary the number of effort levels, as long as there are at least two.
LEMMA 4.15. Given that players are playing words in order of increasing frequency,
for all u that satisfy rare-words preferences and
for all k. We interpret the conditions on the utility function in Theorem 4.16 for a specific class of distributions, namely the Zipfian distribution (see Definition 3.11). For this analysis, we restrict attention to the case where s ≤ 1. Proposition 1.4 gives the criteria for ((H, s ↑ 1 ), (H, s ↑ 2 )) to be a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium for a family of Zipfian distributions, when the dictionaries are sampled with replacement. We note that for large values of n the conditions for when the dictionaries are sampled without replacement are virtually identical to the case where the dictionaries are sampled with replacement. PROOF. From Lemma 4.14, it suffices to show t i · v(w i ) > t i · v(w i ). First, consider the case of additive utility functions. Assume that w i is the jth most frequent word in the universe and w i is the k th most frequent word in the universe (with j > k).
, which gives t i · v(w i ) > t i · v(w i ) for all additive utility functions. Now consider the case of multiplicative utility functions. We have shown that
for all multiplicative utility functions with r ≥ 2.
It should be noted that Theorem 1.4 generalizes to hold for the many effort level model. Namely, Theorem 1.4 will hold for any effort level that is not the lowest effort level. For the lowest effort level, we have Proposition 5.
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CONCLUSIONS
In this article, we introduced a simple model of the ESP game and provided, in many cases, complete characterizations of the equilibria. We introduced a model of match-early preferences to capture the current set-up of the ESP game. We showed that the strategy profile (s, s), where s is an almost decreasing strategy, is a strict ordinal Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of the second-stage of the ESP game (under match-early preferences) for every distribution over U , irrespective of the effort levels chosen in the first-stage. Moreover, we showed that these are the only strategy profiles, where at least one player is playing a consistent strategy, that is a strict ordinal Bayesian-Nash equilibrium for every distribution over U . These results hold even if players have different distributions over U , as long as the total ordering of words in U in terms of frequency is the same for both players. Since the (s
is the most natural of the set of strategies that satisfy the almost decreasing property, we focused on this equilibrium profile when analyzing the equilibrium of the complete game.
The implication of equilibrium characterization for the second-stage ESP game under match-early preferences is that there exists a distribution such that (s
) cannot be an ordinal Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. However, we can make a stronger claim, that there exist distributions for which (s
) cannot be a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium for any valuation function satisfying match-early preferences. We showed that the Zipfian distribution is one such distribution. The Zipfian distribution is significant in this setting since the distribution of words in the English language is known to follow a Zipfian with exponent very close to 1 [Zipf 1932] .
Given the equilibrium analysis for the second-stage, we showed that ((L, s
) is a strict ordinal Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of the complete ESP game, under matchearly preferences, for every distribution over U , except for the uniform distribution. We precluded the existence of a ((H, s ) are weak ordinal Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of the complete ESP game. While the model of the ESP game states that both users have the same utility function, we note that in establishing ordinal Bayesian-Nash equilibrium, these strategy profiles are in equilibrium for any utilities that satisfy match-early preferences. Our equilibrium analysis supports existing empirical results that suggest that users tend to coordinate on low effort words in the ESP game.
In order to model an alternative set-up for the ESP game in which users may choose to coordinate on more difficult words, we introduced the rare-words preferences model. We showed that (s
is a strict ex-post Nash equilibrium for the second-stage of the ESP game under rare-words preferences and every distribution over U . Therefore, we focused on the (s ↑ 1 , s ↑ 2 ) strategy profile when analyzing the complete game. We also showed that the strategy s ↓ is strictly dominated for the second-stage of the ESP game under rare-words preferences and every distribution over U . This is in contrast with the equilibrium analysis of the second-stage game under match-early preferences, where (s
is one of only a few strategy profiles that are ordinal Bayesian-Nash equilibrium for every distribution over U . We also showed that (s
is not an ordinal BayesianNash equilibrium for every distribution over U and there exist distributions, including the Zipfian distribution, such that (s ↑ 1 , s ↑ 2 ) cannot be a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium for any valuation function consistent with match-early preferences. We analyzed the complete ESP game under rare-words preferences. We found that
) is a strict ordinal Bayesian-Nash equilibrium for ever distribution over U . Although low effort, this leads to a (weakly) better outcome than the strategy profile ((L, s ↓ 1 ), (L, s ↓ 2 )), which was the equilibrium under match-early preferences. Although we show that high effort cannot be obtained in an ordinal Bayesian-Nash equilibrium, ((H, s ↑ 1 ), (H, s ↑ 2 )) can be a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium for every distribution over U for certain conditions on the utility function. Since the distribution of words in the English language is known to follow a Zipfian distribution with exponent very close to 1, we interpreted these conditions for the Zipfian distribution by focusing attention on two very natural classes of utility functions, additive utility functions and multiplicative utility functions. Theorem 1.4 showed an interesting result in that, in order to have coordination on low frequency, more descriptive words, it suffices to have a constant difference in points between each subsequent word in the universe. In implementing this, we suggest a delayed reward scheme, where points are adjusted as the systems refines its knowledge of the relevant universe of words. Though it is perhaps unsatisfying to not be able to award the full amount of points upon agreement, it is important to note that the point total will only increase as the center learns more about the set of words in the universe. PROOF. For each w i , w j such that w i w j under s 2 , where s 2 is an almost decreasing strategy, f (w i ) ≥ f (w j ), as long as w j is not the least priority word under s 2 , for all distributions over U . Consider the set A of dictionaries that satisfy the property that w i ∈ l ≤k (s 2 (D 2 )) ∩ w j / ∈ l ≤k (s 2 (D 2 )) and the set B of dictionaries that satisfy the property that
. If w j is the least priority word under s 2 , B = ∅ and A = ∅, so Pr(D 2 ∈ B) < Pr(D 2 ∈ A). Now suppose w j is not the least priority element under s 2 . Notice B is the exactly the set of dictionaries that satisfy:
There exists a mapping t : B → A, which takes a B ∈ B to an A ∈ A, by removing w j and replacing it with w i . The mapping t takes each element B ∈ B to a unique element in A ∈ A, where Pr(B) < Pr(A), due to Lemma A.1. Therefore, Pr(D 2 ∈ B) < Pr(D 2 ∈ A). Hence, the preservation condition is satisfied when s 2 is an almost decreasing strategy, regardless of distribution. Finally, when s 2 is an almost decreasing strategy, Pr( (D 2 )) ) for all i, j, k where i + 1 < j < n and k ≤ d − 1 and for all distributions. When j = n, Pr(w n ∈ l ≤k (s 2 (D 2 )) = 0 for all k ≤ d − 1, so Pr(w i ∈ D 2 ) > Pr(w n ∈ l ≤k (s 2 (D 2 )) for all i < n and k ≤ d − 1. Hence, the strong condition is satisfied for all distributions over U . Lemma 3.7, along with Theorem 2.10, gives the desired result.
LEMMA 3.10. For every (e 2 , s 2 ) (except for s 2 that are almost decreasing), there exists a distribution over U , an effort level e 1 , and a dictionary for which Algorithm 1 will not output an ordering in agreement with s 2 . PROOF. Since s 2 is not an almost decreasing strategy, there exists adjacent w i w i+1 under s 2 such that f (w i ) < f (w i+1 ) and i < n − 1. Let i be the smallest such index. Assume that w i+1 is the kth most frequent element in U . Consider the following distribution over U : The top k most frequent words in U have frequency 1− k and the n − k least frequent words in U have frequency n−k , where < (n−2d+1)(n−k) nk−dk+(n−k) (n−2d+1) . ( − 1) ) and do not contain w i+1 . Set B contains dictionaries that have w i in the top j positions of s 2 (D 2 ) and also contain w i+1 . Set C contains dictionaries that have have w i+1 in the top i positions and do not contain w i . We construct t 1 : A → C and t 2 : B → C. t 1 replaces w i with w i+1 . Since w i and w i+1 are adjacent in s 2 and A and C are non-empty, t 1 is a bijection. From Lemma A.1, each A ∈ A that occurs with probability p A is mapped to a C ∈ C that occurs with probability at least as high as
. There exists at least one case such that this inequality is strict. Thus Pr(
, so |B| < |C|. Thus there exists a t 2 that takes each B ∈ B to a unique C ∈ C. t 2 removes w i and replaces it with an x ∈ U − B. t 2 maps a B ∈ B that occurs with probability p B to a C ∈ C that occurs with probability
. Combining this with
). Consider any D 1 with w i as the jth highest priority word under s 2 . Given the selection of i, the first j − 1 words of D 1 are in order of decreasing frequency. Therefore, Algorithm 1 will output the first j − 1 words of D 1 according to s 2 . At the jth step of the algorithm, since Pr(
, w i will not be output.
LEMMA 3.12. If there exists an Therefore, u(s (1) The match happens after l 2 . Swapping w 1 and w 2 does not change the outcome. PROOF. We define the candidate solution to the linear system of equations as follows: It is easy to see from this definition of y ij that 0 ≤ y ij ≤ 1 for all i, j. Also note that, for all j:
Now it remains to show that the candidate y ij satisfies equations of the second type. Note that: 
where the last expression denotes the probability of obtaining
. Now going back to equations of the second type:
LEMMA 4.11. If a solution to the second system of linear equations exists, then a solution to the first system of linear equations exists. Namely, this solution can be obtained by
PROOF. Since a solution exists to the second system of linear equations, there exists a set of y ij that satisfies:
Observe that this gives a solution to the first type of equation in the first linear system of equations, where
This same set of y ij satisfies:
, then PROOF. We map each high dictionary to a set of low dictionaries, using the mapping from Section 4. We use the following distribution over U , each low word is sampled with probability 1− |U L | and each high word is sampled with probability |U H |−|U L | . Under this distribution, the probability of sampling a dictionary consisting of low words only, is greater than d!·( Since w i w j under s 2 and f (w i ) = f (w j ), Pr(w i ∈ l ≤k (s 2 (D 2 )) > Pr(w j ∈ l ≤k (s 2 (D 2 )), by Lemma 3.9. Therefore, the desired inequality is satisfied for this case and the inequality is strict. Now we handle the case where w i ∈ U L and w j ∈ U H . Since w i is in the top k words of D, there exists at least one dictionary D 2 with w i in the top k words. This dictionary occurs with probability greater than any high effort word occurs in a dictionary D 2 . Therefore, the desired inequality is satisfied for this case and the inequality is strict. Since there exists at least one value of D 1,H such that h(D 1,H ) = D 1,H , there exists a value of k and D 1,H such that the inequality is strict. Therefore, playing (L, s 2 ) is a strict ordinal best response to (H, s 2 ). 
